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Abstract 
Rational agents, information systems and knowledge bases all share the property that they may be- 
come more effective by combining information from multiple sources. However, as was clearly indicated 
by the notorious "Judge puzzle" proposed by W. J. Schoenmakers in 1986, combining information from 
several sources is a dangerous operation.  The resulting  database may turn out to be inconsistent,  or 
even worse: there are situations where the result is consistent but supports inferences which contradict 
the beliefs of all contributing agents. 
In this paper we investigate the possibilities and limitations of strategies for coping with this prob- 
lem. Our first attempt tries to characterize those situations where information can be combined without 
risking the undesirable situation that some derivable proposition  contradicts  the beliefs of all agents 
involved.  The resulting notion is called Absolute  safely.  It turns out however that for that case only 
trivial solutions exist.  Consequently any non-trivial strategy must use information about the epistemic 
states of the agents involved. 
Subsequently we investigate less restrictive  notions of safety. The more interesting ones involve not 
only propositions about the world but also epistemic information about the knowledge of the agents. 
This information can be formulated conveniently using the logic of belief dependence which has been 
designed by the first  author, and which has been used previously for designing effectively computable 
belief revision procedures. 
The results  characterizing the  alternative safety notions generalize for this  extended logic. We 
present a notion of restricted  almost safety  within this framework which describes the safety of com- 
bining information under the hypothesis that the contributing agents eventually would have exchanged 
their information among themselves.  For this notion an explicit solution to the Judge puzzle is given. 
1  Introduction 
The construction of models for multi-agent epistemic systems has become one of the most interesting and 
popular topics in artificial intelligence and in the theory of knowledge based expert systems. Information 
systems in the real world are loaded by combining information from many (possibly unrelated) sources. 
As is generally known merging information may produce inconsistent knowledge bases.  However, an even 
more subtle risk was indicated by W. J. Schoenmakers [0] when he published his Judge puzzle.  This puzzle 
describes the situation where an agent, called the judge, by combining information from two other agents, 
called the witnesses, consistently obtains a conclusion which contradicts the belief sets of both witnesses: 
Once upon a time a wise but strictly .formal judge  questioned two witnesses.  They spoke  to 
her  on separate  occasions.  Witness w l  honestly stated  his  conviction  that proposition  p  was 
true.  Witness w2 honestly stated that he believed that the  implication p ~  q was true.  Nothing 
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concluded that q  had to  be true.  However,  when  the  two  witnesses heard about  her conclusion 
they were shocked because  they both  were convinced that q  was false.  But they were  too  late to 
prevent  the verdict  to  be executed... 
As pointed out by Schoenmakers, in the above story nobody can be blamed for this situation to arise. 
The  witnesses,  even  though  formally required  to  tell  everything they  know,  are  not  responsible  since 
neither  of them was  asked about  q and  hardly  could know at  the time of interrogation that  the  truth 
of q was at  stake.  The judge on the other hand had no reason to even consider the possibility  that her 
argument was unsound, since there is not the slightest trace of contradiction in the testimony.  She might 
have asked on, and confronted the witnesses with her conclusion that q was true.  For the judge this would 
have been possible, but, as Schoenmakers indicates, this possibility is lost in the case of a knowledge base 
being loaded with information from independent sources, since by the time proposition q turns out to be 
relevant the two informants no longer are accessible.  And therefore Schoenmakers concludes: 
Intelligent  database  systems  may  behave  perfectly  in  splendid  isolation,  operating  on  one 
world without inconsistencies,  but even when they are consistent they may produce unacceptable 
results  when operating  on  the  information  that  is accessible  in a  community  of such systems. 
Their results will be acceptable,  most of the  time,  but  nobody knows when. 
Consequently it becomes relevant to look for a  characterization of situations where combining infor- 
mation from multi sources is safe~ which informally means that no conclusion drawn from the combined 
information is disbelieved by all informants.  At the same time our combination operator should support at 
least the derivation of one proposition not already supported by one of the contributing agents; otherwise 
the problem of obtaining the right information reduces to the identification of the right source. 
However, having formalized this  problem, we prove a  triviality theorem expressing that  a  combining 
operation satisfying the above form of absolute safety doesn't exist.  Consequently, a more refined approach 
is required which takes into account both the information contributed by the agents and their complete 
belief sets.  In this context the notions of safety and strong safety are defined, and some characterizations 
are obtained.  It follows that dangerous situations only arise when every agent disagrees with some other 
agent about  some of the propositions which are actually communicated. 
These results once more indicate that in a multi agent environment one should maintain a strict dis- 
tinction between information accepted on behalf of an other agent, and information which is incorporated 
in your own belief set.  The resulting process of accepting information followed by incorporating it, is one 
of the main motivations for the introduction of the logic of belief dependence  [0] by the first author.  This 
logic has been previously applied for effectively choosing between several belief revision strategies [0], and 
for an earlier solution to the Judge puzzle  [0]. 
Compared to our previous paper  [0] we believe that we presently can make a  much stronger case for 
the  "contrived" solution to the judge puzzle presented in the final section of that paper.  The triviality 
theorem shows that there is no simple solution for the problem.  The characterization of the less restrictive 
safety notions shows that  danger is  caused by  disagreement between agents  and  disagreement between 
agents is a fact of life we can't get around.  The case for a  two stage process for belief incorporation has 
been argued elsewhere [0, 0]; it is also supported by psychological research.  However, when generalizing 
the safety notions  to the case of our epistemic logic of belief dependence, the  characterizations for the 
propositional case extend, and so do their negative consequences.  Therefore, the best  we can hope for is 
a  specific belief incorporation strategy for the judge which is approximatively safe. 
The  proposed  notion  of restricted  almost  safety  characterizes the  situation  where the  conclusion of 
the judge will not contradicted by all witnesses, provided they will eventually have access to each other's 
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dependence, leading  to  an effectively testable  condition for  deciding whether a  specific belief revision 
operator for the judge is almost safe or not. 
2  Combining  information from multiple agents;  the triviality result 
In the sequel I  denotes a finite and non-empty set of the agents called informants  and a the receiver, an 
agent who receives and combines information from the informants I. In this section, we study the case of 
propositional logic Lp, where information communicated between agents consists of pure propositional 
formulas without modal operators.  The language Lp is recursively constructed from a primitive proposi- 
tion set ~0 and the Boolean connectives as usual.  Moreover, the logical notions of a semantic model, the 
satisfiability relations  ~, and the consequence operation Cn, are defined as usual. 
The receiver's obtained information, is  a mapping ~b from the informants I  into the formula set Lp. 
We use the notation {¢i}ieI to denote the set {¢(i) E Lp  : i C I}.  The set {,¢i}iet is called the obtained 
information  set.  Each informant may contribute a finite set of formulas which expresses his share in the 
information exchange; this finite set clearly can be reduced to a single formula by taking the corresponding 
conjunction formula)  Furthermore, the informants' original behef sets are represented by a mapping 
from the informant set I  into the powerset of the formula set.  We also use the notation {q/i}~ez to denote 
the set  {kO(i)  e  79(Lp)  : i  e  I},  which is  called  an  original  information  set.  These  sets  {qli}ieI  are 
not required to  be finite.  In this  paper,  we only consider the case where all informants honestly offer 
information they actually support.  This leads to the following definition: 
Definition 2.1  (Potential information  set)  An  original  information  set {qli}ieI  is said  to  be  a po- 
tential information  set of an obtained information  set {¢i}ieI iff it satisfies the following conditions: 
(i) (Honesty  Condition)  ~(i) ~  ¢(i), for all i e  I,  and 
(i  0  (Consistency Condition)  ql(i)  is consistent, for all i E I. 
In the sequel we shall use the word set for information set when no confusion can arise. 
Definition 2.2  (Danger)  Suppose  that  some  original set  {q~i}/eI  is a  potential set  of an obtained  set 
{¢i}ieI.  Then  the set  {q2i}iez is said to  be dangerous  with  respect  to  the set  {q/i}ieI  iff there  exists a 
E Lp  such that 
(i) 
(ii) ~(i) ~  ~2 for all i e  I. 
Remarks:  Condition (i) means that the receiver's obtained information implies some fact ~p for which 
according to Condition (ii) all informants originally believe its negation.  The more general notion where 
some derivable fact ~  is disbelieved by some but not necessarily all informants is not interesting for our 
purposes; a contributed set will be "dangerous" in this more general sense with respect to an original set, 
unless it represents a proposition which is already compatible with the original belief set of all informants. 
The latter situation is frequently considered in artificial intelligence, where collected information always 
represent a partial description of the true world.  In our approach we don't require such a true world in 
the background; we just want to ensure that derivable information is at least compatible with the beliefs 
of some agent. 
In the following, {¢i}~eI and {~/}ieI denote an obtained set and an original set respectively if it cannot 
cause any ambiguities. 
1Here we use  the fact that the languages considered in  this paper  are closed under  conjunction;  the case where we don't 
assume  this closure property is a  subject for further research. 
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case  that  {¢i}iex  is dangerous  with  respect  to any  of its potential  sets  {qi}iex- 
Definition  2.4  (Triviality)  A  set {g'~}ie/ is trivial  iff for any formula  ~,  such  that {¢i}ieI ~  ~P,  there 
exists  an i  E I  such  that ¢(i)  ~  qz. 
Clearly a  set is trivial iff some formula g,(i) is logically equivalent  to A{g'i}ieI,  which means  that in 
fact one informant  has already contributed  all available information by himself.  This observation  easily 
follows by taking T =  A{,C/}ieI 
It turns out that absolute safety is a condition which is so strong that it supports only trivial situations: 
Theorem  2.1  (Triviality  Theorem)  A  consistent  set {,¢i}ieI  is absolutely  safe  iff it is trivial. 
The proof for this result is easy. Assuming non-triviality there exists a proposition ¢  such that for no 
i  one has {¢i}~eI  ~  ~; consequently  the potential  set  ~(i) =  {¢(i), ~},  for all i  E I  is dangerous  with 
respect  to {g,i}/el.  The converse implication is a  direct  consequence  of the triviality condition. 
Consequently, the best one can hope for are safety notions which explicitly relate the obtained set and 
the potential set.  Two possible definitions are: 
Definition  2.5  (Safety)  If an obtained  {~bi}/e/  is consistent,  and an original  set {#i)~e/  is a potential 
set of {',/'i}ie/,  then  the  set {¢/}/eI  is said to  be safe  with  respect  to  the set {#i}/e/  iff the  set {¢i}ieI  is 
not  dangerous  with  respect  to  the set {#i}/eI. 
Definition  2.6  (Strong  Safety)  If a set {~b/}iei  is consistent,  and {~l/i}ieI is a potential  set of {¢i}/eI, 
then  the  set {¢i}/eI  is said  to  be strongly safe with  respect to  the set {~/}iex  iff 
for  any ~,  if {¢i}/el  ~  q0,  then  there  exists  an i e  I  such  that  ~(i)  ~  ¢2. 
The connection between these two notions is illustrated  by the following: 
Propositions  2.1  If {¢/}ie/  is  a  consistent  set,  and {~/}ie/  is  a potential  set  of {¢i}ier,  then  the  set 
{ ,g'i}ieI is safe  with  respect to its potential  set {~i}iel  iff 
for  any qp,  if {¢i}ieI ~  qP,  then  it  is not  the  case  that for all i  C I,  ~(i)  ~  ~p. 
So where the safety condition  requires  that  every derivable formula q~ is not  disbelieved  by all infor- 
mants,  the condition  of strong safety requires  that  at least one of the informants positively supports  qD. 
It follows that strong safety is a stronger notion than safety; see the third example below. 
Example  2.1  •  (p,p ~  q)  is neither strongly  safe  nor safe  with respect  to  the potential  set 
({p,-~q}, {-~p,~qi).(Judge  puzzle) 
•  (p ~  q, q ~  p)  is strongly  safe  and safe  with  respect  to ({~p, q}, {-,p, ~q}). 
® (p,p ~  q)  is safe  with  respect  to  ({p, pV q},{p ~  q,q ~  p}),  but  not  strongly  safe  with  respect  to 
({p, pV q}, {p ~  q,q ~  p}).  (Distinction  between  safety and  strong  safety) 
One can easily give alternative characterizations  of these safety notions.  Evidently a  trivial obtained 
set  is strongly safe with respect  to every potential  set.  The safety notions  are  moreover  trivial for the 
case of a  single informant.  The two theorems below relate safety to consistency and to disagreement: 
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set of {,Ci}iei,  then the set {¢i}iel  is safe with respect to the original set {~i}iet iff there exists an i  E I 
such that ~(i) U {1~i}ieI  is consistent. 
Lemma  2.1  If a consistent set {¢i}iet  is dangerous with  respect to a potential set {~i}iel,  then for all 
i e z,  ¢(i)  and 
PROOF.  Suppose that a consistent set {¢i}iex is dangerous with respect to a potential set {~i}ieI. 
Then,  by definition, there  exists a  qo  such that  {¢i}ieI  ~  ~  and  ~(i)  ~  -~T for all i  E I.  Therefore, 
A{¢i}ie! ~  q0, and consequently ~  A{¢/}~e/~ 1~ and by contraposition ~  -~ ~  -~ A{ ,~,~}~1. 
However, since {¢~}~et is dangerous  ~(i) ~  -~q~ for any i E I  and therefore,  ~(i) ~  -~ h{,C~}~et for any 
iEI. 
Fina~lly, it is easy to see that for any i E I,/(i)  ~  A{¢~}~ez, because, if ¢(i) ~  A{¢~}~e~ for any i E I, 
then  {¢i}ie/is  trivial,  and then,  by the triviality theorem,  {¢i}ieI is  absolutely safe,  whence  {¢i}ie~ 
cannot be dangerous with respect to any potential set, and a contradiction follows. 
Theorem  2.3  (Disagreement  Theorem)  If a  consistent  set  {¢~}~e~ is  dangerous  with  respect  to  a 
potential set {il~i}iei,  then there exists for every j  E I  some formula qo and an i  E I  such that ~b(i) ~  qa 
and ~(j) ~  ~. 
PROOF.  Suppose that a consistent set {¢i}icI is dangerous with respect to a potential set {~i}iet. 
Then by the above lemma, we have, 
(A) ~(j) ~  -7 h{¢i}ieI for all j  E I. 
Now, suppose that the conclusion (B) of the disagreement theorem is false, then we have (C). 
(B) (Vje Z)(3 )(3i  e  I)(¢(0  and 
(C) (Bj E I)(Vqp)(Vi e  I)(¢(i) ~  qP ~  ~(J) ~  q0). 
However, we know that ¢(i) ~  ¢(i) for any i E I.  Therefore, by (C), we have, 
(3j E I)(Vi E I)(!I~(j) ~  ¢(i)). 
So, we have, 
(D) (3j E I)(~(j) p  A{¢i}iez). 
Consequently,  from (D) and (A), we conclude that this particular ~(j) is inconsistent, contradicting our 
assumption that {~i}ieI is a potentiM set.  [] 
Observe that the conclusion of the disagreement theorem can't be strengthened to a form which expresses 
definite disagreement:  there exists for every j  E I  some formula ¢p and an i E I  such that Ib(i) ~  qo  and 
!I~(j) ~  ~tP- This conclusion only can be proven if we assume that the sets {¢i}iez  satisfy the strong 
condition  ~(j) ~  (¢V ¢) iff ~(j) ~  ¢ or ¢(j) ~  ~, i.e., if we assume that our agents use an intuitionistic 
interpretation of disjunction. 
Corollary 2.1  If a consistent set {¢i}iet is dangerous with respect to a potential set {~i}iex,  then there 
exist for every j  E I  an i E I  and a formula ta in the consequence set Cn({¢(i)}) such that ~(i) ~  ~  and 
~(J) ~  ta; such a formula SP is called a disagreement formula for j. 
In the judge puzzle story, the formula p ~  q is a disagreement formula for Wl, since ~(wl) =  {p, -~q} ~: 
P ~  q and ~(w2) =  {-~p, -~q} ~  p --~ q.  The implication of the disagreement theorem is that in a multi- 
agent information system in order to guarantee safety, agents must be prohibited to talk about something 
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others'  propositional  attitudes,  and  this  clearly represents  an  unrealistic  assumption.  Nonetheless  the 
result implies that we should focus on the cases where disagreement may arise, and look for mechanisms 
for coping with it.  As we indicate below, the logic of belief dependence turns out  to be a  useful tool in 
this direction. 
3  Logic of belief dependence 
The logic of belief dependence was introduced [0]  in order to model the situation  where agents rely on 
each other  with  respect  to  information.  It  also  provides  a  tool  for  modeling  a  two stage  process  for 
information  acquisition  in a  multi-agent system:  in the first  stage  agents include information of other 
agents  in  compartimentalized  sub-beliefs  and  in  the  second  stages  these  sub-beliefs  are  processed  and 
incorporated  into the agents own beliefs.  For further information and motivation we refer to [0]. 
Our logic contains in the first place the general notions of knowledge and belief; these notions are the 
equivalents of those in epistemic and doxastic logic.  For our purposes  the difference between knowledge 
and belief is  almost never important.  Therefore we generally use Lip  to represent the fact that  agent i 
knows or believes the formula ~.  If we need to emphasize that  we are talking about  knowledge rather 
than belief, we will enforce this by adding the required axioms for the operators Li. 
The second important notion used for reasoning about dependent knowledge and beliefs is called the 
dependent  operator,  or alternatively rely-on  relation,  and it is  denoted by Di,j.  Intuitively, we can give 
Di,jq? a number of different interpretations:  "agent i relies on agent j  about the formula ~", or, "agent j 
is the credible advisor of agent i about ~". 
The dependent operator resembles the awareness operator introduced by Fagin and Halpern [0] in the 
sense that it operates on the formulas rather than their meaning.  For example it is possible in our system 
that  Di,j(p A q)  whereas Di,j(q A p)  comes out  to be false.  Evidently one may prevent  such anomalies 
by axiomatizing the Di,j operator.  The most natural condition to enforce is neutrality:  Di,jqo ~  Di,j~, 
which  states  that  dependence is  independent  of whether some fact  is  stated  in  a  positive  or negative 
way. A  slightly less convincing condition is closure under conjunction; the problem is that closure under 
conjunction in combination with neutrality enforces that agent i depends on agent j  concerning the true 
and false proposition as soon as i depends on j  concerning anything at all.  The reader is referred to [0, 0] 
• for further information on reasonable axioms for the dependent operator. 
The  third  element  in  our  logic  is  the  compartment  operator,  or  alternatively  called  the  sub-belief 
operator,  written  Li,3.  Intuitively,  Li,jT  can  be  read  "agent  i  believes  ~  due  to  agent j'.  From the 
viewpoint of minds society,  Li,j~  can be more intuitively interpreted as "agent i  believes or knows qD on 
the mind frame indexed j. 
The resulting language is  sufficiently rich for formalizing both stages in the multi-agent information 
acquisition process mentioned above:  compartmentalized information is modeled by sub-beliefs Li,jT for 
agent i, whereas incorporated information corresponds to general beliefs of agent i, namely, Liqz. 
Supposed we have a  set An of n  agents, and a  set ¢0 of primitive propositions,  the language L D  for 
belief dependence logics is the minimal set of formulas closed by usual syntactic rules. 
Definition  3.1  (D-model)  A  belief dependence  D-model  is a  tuple  M  =  (S,~r,£,~D),  where  S  is a set 
of states,  7r(s, .) is a truth  assignment for each state s E S,  and £  : An ~  T'(S × S),  which  consists  of n 
binary serial accessibility  relations  on S,  and "D : An × An × S  ~  ~(LD). 
Remarks:  Note that the structure of the D-model is similar to the semantic model in Fagin and Halpern's 
general awareness logic, which was designed to cope with the problem of logical omniscience [0]. 
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M, s ~  p,  iff ~'(s,p) =true, for p a primitive proposition 
M, s  ~  -~  iff M, s  ~: 
M,s~iA~2  iffM, s~lhM,  s~cp2, 
M,s ~  LiT  iff M,t ~  ~ for all t such (s,t) •  £(i) 
M,s ~  Di,j~  iff qp •  7?(i,j,s). 
For D-models, we define sub-beliefs  as  Li,j~ d=ef Di,j~ A Lj~;  this implies  that agents in our system 
are honest because the honesty axiom Li,jT ~  LiT holds.  2 
A minimal logic system for D-models, called LD system consists of the following axioms and rules: 
Axioms: 
(BA) All instances of propositionM tautologies. 
(KL)  ^  +  ¢) + 
(DL) -~Li_l_. 
Rules of Inference: 
(MP)  e  ¢ 
(NECL) ~ T ~  LiT. 
Definitions; 
(Lijdf) Li,jT ~f D~,jT A Lj~ 
Theorem 3.1  The logic LD  is sound and complete .for the class of D-models [0]. 
We call a formula set which is consistent (with the logic LD) a  belief state.  A  belief set is a subset of 
a belief state consisting of formula's specifically relevant to some particular agent. 
For the dynamic part  of our proposed  solution to  the Judge puzzle  we need  a  belief maintenance 
operation which will be invoked during the second stage of the information assimilation.  We introduce 
the  notion  of the  belief maintenance  model, which is  an  ordered couple  <  K, A  >  such  that  K  is  a 
collection of belief sets and ~  : K  × L D  ~  K  is a function assigning a belief set Z~(K, ~) to any belief set 
K  •  K  and each formula ~  in LD.  We shall write alternatively K~T  to represent  ~(K, T).  Again our 
proposed framework is liberal with respect to the choice of the belief maintenance operation used.  We 
will return to this issue in section 6. 
4  Information  acquisition in a  belief dependence  framework 
In this section, we consider the information acquisition problem in our framework of belief dependence 
logic.  The extension the definitions which have appeared in section 2 for the case of belief dependence 
is  easy:  one simply replaces the propositional language Lp  by the language LD,  propositional  models 
by D-models, and the relation  ~  for propositional logic by its counterpart for belief dependence logic. 
Consequently, whenever we say a formula set K  is consistent, we mean that K  is consistent with respect 
to the LD system unless stated otherwise. 
In the resulting theory the (negative) results from section 2 remain valid, indicating that for a solution 
of problems like the Judge puzzle the formalization of the relevant information into the language of belief 
dependence logic by itself will be insufficient in order to remove the observed anomaly. 
The translation between the propositional formulation of our problem and its formalization in terms 
of belief states K  in the logic of belief dependence invokes a few auxiliary notations defined below: 
L~,j(K) ~f {~ •  LD : K  ~  Li,j~}, denotes agent i's compartimentalized belief set indexed j. 
~In the section 5 we will need the more demanding notion of reliable sub-beliefs L~,j~p  which is defined as Di,j~AD3,j~ALj~. 
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La+l({¢i}iE1) de=f {La,i~(i)  e  L D  : i  e  I},  is  a  formula set  expressing the information obtained by  the 
receiver from the informants before the receiver has incorporated (part of) this information. 
The notion of a  configuration represents the generalization of a potential set from section 2: 
Definition  4.1  (Configuration)  A  configuration  C  is  a four  place  tuple  (a,I,  ?,~),  where  a  E  An 
denotes an  agent,  called receiver, I  C  An  is a finite  and non-empty set of informants,  ~l, : I  ~  L D  is a 
mapping from I  into LD,  called the obtained information,  and ql : I  ~  7P(LD)  is a mapping from I  into 
the powerset of LD,  called the original information. 
Since the required proofs are insensitive to the precise logical language being used it will not surprising 
that the main results of section 2 remain valid for the logic of belief dependence: 
Theorem 4.1  (Triviality Theorem(Restated))  A  consistent  obtained set  {~'i}ieI  is  absolutely safe 
iff it is trivial. 
Theorem 4.2  (Disagreement Theorem(Restated))  Let C =  {a, I, ~b, k~) be a configuration.  Suppose 
that {¢i}iel is consistent,  and {q/i}ieI is a potential set of {¢i}ieI.  If {¢i}iel  is dangerous with respect 
to the set {~i}ieI,  then there exists for every agent j  E I  a formula ¢p and agent i E I  such that ¢(i) ~ 
and  g= 
For a belief state K  in belief dependence logic and an agent a, we want to induce a  configuration for 
a from K.  In this induced configuration agent a  becomes the receiver and the remaining agents become 
the informants. Both the contributed information and the originM information is obtained from the befief 
set K  as indicated below. 
Definition 4.2  (Induced  Configuration)  Suppose  that K  be  a  belief state,  and a  be  an agent E  A=. 
A  configuration C  = (a, I, ¢, ~), called the induced configuration for a from K,  is constructed as follows: 
(1) I  is the set {i E A,~ : 3~o(La,i~ E K)}. 
(2) If I  is not empty,  then for all i E I, ~(i) =  L~-(  K),  otherwise the induced configuration does not exist. 
(3) For all i E I,  if L~,i(g )  is finite,  then let ¢(i)  be AL2,~(K), otherwise the induced configuration does 
not exist. 
For an agent a  C An a belief state K  is said to be a  DB set for a iff the induced configuration for a 
from K  exists.  Evidently the induced configuration (a, I, ~/,, ~) for a from K  is unique whenever it exists. 
We introduce the notation C(a, K)  for the induced configuration for a  from K.  Moreover, due to the 
honesty condition contained in definition (Lijdf) the original information set  ~(i) is  a  potential set for 
~b(i) for each i  E I.  The concept of the induced configuration makes it  possible to translate the safety 
definitions from section 2 to belief states in belief dependence logic: 
Definition  4.3  (Safety for a  in K)  For  an  agent  a  E  An  and  a  DB  set  K  for  a,  let  C(a,K)  =< 
a, I, ¢, •  >  be  the  induced configuration for  a from  K,  then  {¢i}ieI  is  said  to  be  safe for  a  in  K  iff 
{¢i}ieI is safe with respect to {~i}ieI. 
Theorem 4.3  (Safety Theorem(Restated))  Let a and K  be an agent and a DB set respectively.  Sup- 
pose that the induced configuration for a from K,  C(a, K)  =  (a, I, ¢, ~2), then {~/'i}iEl is safe for a  in K 
iff there  exists an i E I  such that L~(K)U {~/'i}ieI  is consistent. 
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In order to evaluate whether obtained information is safe the receiver a still needs information on the true 
belief states  of his  informants;  the translation into the belief dependence logic and the introduction of 
configurations has not changed this necessity.  However, if we take into consideration which mechanisms 
might have produced  the sub-beliefs  in a  multi-agent environment, it  turns out  that  these mechanisms 
themselves may provide us with additional structure supporting the introduction of alternative and weaker 
safety notions. 
The notion of almost  safety  defined in this section is based on one possible hypothesis concerning the 
creation of sub-beliefs:  the so-called initial role-knowledge assumption.  This hypothesis states that within 
a multi agent environment the dependency relations are common knowledge: it is not known who knows 
what or who believes what, but  for each proposition it is  known how the agents depend on each other 
concerning this proposition. 
That this information is relevant is shown by the example below. Assume that some agent i believes ¢ 
and says so to the receiver. Suppose moreover that the receiver has learned previously that agent j  believes 
-~¢. Finally agent i depends on agent j  concerning ¢.  According to the initial role-knowledge assumption 
it is common knowledge that Di,j¢,  so the receiver knows that as well. In this situation the receiver can 
conclude that something strange is going on: would the two agents i and j  have been given the possibility 
to exchange their information, agent i  would have been convinced by j  that his belief concerning ¢  was 
wrong.  Moreover, this prediction can be made by the receiver without any further interaction with the 
informants!  It is based on this information that the receiver can disregard the information provided by i 
substituting it by the opposite information provided by agent j. 
The notion of almost safety formalizes safety with respect to the hypothetical scenario which will arise 
when all informants exchange their information before sharing their knowledge with the receiver. In order 
to be able to reason about these hypothetical belief states we need one further notion: 
Definition  5.1  (Combined Sub-belief) 
L~j(K) d=ef {~ C LD: (3j C I)(K  ~  Di,j~ h Dj,j~ A Ljqo)}. 
The notion of almost  safety is  obtained from the safety notion by allowing for one more propositional 
attitude  for  an  informant with  respect  to the consequences of the contributed information (clause (ii) 
below): 
Definition  5.2  (Almost Safety)  For an agent a E As  and a DB set K  for a,  if C(a, K) =  (a, I, ¢, ~1) 
is the induced  configuration  for a from K,  {,¢i}ieI  is said  to  be almost safe for a  in K  iff for any ~,  if 
{/i}ieI ~  V,  then,  either  (i)  there exists i E I  such that L~-(K) ~£ ~qo, or (ii) there exists an i E I  such 
that LS(K )  is consistent  and LS(K ) ~  ~. 
We illustrate this notion by an example of a possible configuration for the judge puzzle: 
Consider a  DB set K  =  {Lwl(p A -~q), L~o2((p ~  q) A -~q), Owl,wlP,  Dw2,w2(P ~  q),  Dw2,wlP, La,wlP, 
La,w2(p ~  q)} So,/=  {wl, w2}, ¢(wl) = p, ¢(w2)= p -, q,  ~(wl) =  {pA~q}, ~(w2) =  {(p --, q)A-,q}. 
The  induced  configuration for  a  from  K  is  (a,I,¢,~),  with  {¢i}ieI  =  {P,P  ~  q}"  Moreover, from 
K  ~  Lwlp A Dwl,wlP h D~o2,w~P, we have L~,z,i(K ) = {p,p ~  q} so L~:,i(K) is consistent.  Evidently, for 
any ~, if {¢i}iet ~  ~, then L:2,i(K) ~  ¢p.  Therefore, {,¢i}ieI is almost safe for a in K. 
It is  a  direct  consequence of the definition that  almost  safety is  a  weaker notion  than safety.  The 
notions  turn out  to be equivalent in  the degenerate case that  the informants  don't rely on each other 
concerning any proposition.  By a straightforward generalization of previous characterizations we obtain: 
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(a, I, ¢, k9) be the induced configuration for a from K; then {~bi}iEI is almost safe for a in I( iff there exists 
an i E I  such that either L~-(K) U {,¢i}ies is consistent,  or L~,i(I( )  is consistent and L~,I(K ) ~  {g'i}iel. 
This theorem establishes that almost safety is a property which, in principle, for a given configuration, can 
be tested effectively: for configuration C  =  (a, I, ¢, ~), we say that  almost-safety test statement  (ASTS) 
holds in C  iff: 
(3i E I)(L~ (K)U {¢i}ieI is consistent or (L~,i(I() is consistent and L~t(K ) ~  {~)i}iEl)). 
6  Almost  Safety  on  Belief Maintenance  Operation 
In this  section we consider the dynamic process of belief revision corresponding to the second stage of 
the two stage information acquisition  process mentioned in section 3.  Given a  configuration where the 
receiver has obtained sub-beliefs by hearing statements by his informants, the receiver will subsequently 
revise his own belief by incorporation part  of these sub-beliefs  into his own belief.  Clearly he should do 
so in a safe way; we now have the tools available for formalizing this requirement. 
Let K  be a collection of belief sets.  As announced before a belief maintenance operation A  : K × L D 
K  is a function assigning a belief set A(X, ~) to any belief set X  E K  and each formula ~  in LD. 
A belief maintenance operation A  can be defined in many ways.  For our application we are interested 
in belief maintenance operators with a  special form:  the rational agent checks whether or not a  special 
formula ~i belongs to the belief set  X  when she faces the new information p~.  If so, then  the result  of 
A(X, p~) is a new belief set ~.3. 
{  Y~  if~o~a EX, p=p~ 
°.,  ,.° 
A(X, p)  =  ~.  if ~i.  E X, p =  p}. 
X  otherwise 
For belief maintenance operation  A,  we can use a  set  of rules  with  the following form  to simplify  the 
representation: 
Each  rule  represents  some  case in  the  definition  of the  function.  We  omit  the  rule  representing  the 
"otherwise" case since it represents the default.  Intuitively, each rule of the above form says that  if ~i 
holds in the belief set X, then the result of the maintenance with the new information p~ is Y/. 
We are considering possible safe belief maintenance operations for the receiver a  in some belief state 
K  representing the actual exchange of information.  For this  situation  the relevant  belief set  X  equals 
L~(K). 
As in our previous paper  [0] we use traditional update operations like  revision,  contraction  and  ex- 
pansion, to define the belief maintenance operation.  It is  known that,  aside from the trivial but  unsafe 
expansion  operator,  such  belief revision and  contraction functions  are non-trivial to construct  and  cer- 
tainly not  unique.  Therefore  we assume  that  we have selected  some group  of revision functions  to be 
used in the sequel.  In particular we assume that these operations satisfy the AGM postulates  [0]. The 
selected revision function will be denoted 4.  We define the corresponding contraction function  -"  using 
the Harper Identity in terms of the revision function. 
3This form is called  a  type 3 belief maintenance operation in [0] 
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form:a: 
where 0~ E {4, "-, +}. 
~(L~(K),p)  =  { 
L~(K)OlZbi~  if ~i~  E L~(K),p = p~ 
•  ..  ... 
L~-(t()O~¢in  if ~i.  E LZ(K),p = p~. 
K  otherwise 
This form  of the  belief revision  operator  shows  that  the  receiver  only revises  his  private  knowledge 
on the basis of formulas  contained therein.  Our goal is to define an AS operation  for the receiver a  with 
respect  to the obtained  set {¢/}~cr.  Also the revision should lead to the incorporation of the obtained set, 
since we want to determine under which circumstances  it is safe to do so.  Recall that AL~r({¢i}iel)  and 
A{¢i}~EI denote respectively the compartimentalized  belief and the incorporated belief which corresponds 
the obtained  set  {,¢/}ies.  In the sequel these two important  formulas  will be  denoted  by epart(¢)  and 
ineorp(~b)  respectively. 
Definition  6.1  (AS  Operation)  A  belief maintenance  operation  ZX  : K  x  LD  ~  K  is  said  to  be  an 
almost safety one for agent a  E  A,  with respect to {¢i}iel,  iff for any DB set K  E K  for a  such  that 
L2(K )  ~epart(¢)  and L2(K )  ~ineorp(¢),  it  will be the  case  that A(Lj(K),epart(¢))  ~ineorp(¢) 
only when {¢i}/e/"  is almost safe for a  in K. 
Remarks:  (i) We define almost safety for a  belief maintenance operation  in terms of the general almost- 
safety notion. 
(ii) We consider only the case where the knowledge state K  is a DB set for a since otherwise the induced 
configuration does not exist, and consequently the concept of almost safety does not make sense. 
(iii) L~(K)  ~epart(~,)  means that the receiver a has full knowledge about  his compartimentalized  infor- 
mation AL a+,i(  {¢i}iei). 
(iv) L~'(K) ~incorp(¢)  and ~(L~(K),epart(¢))  ~incorp(¢)  together means that we consider only the 
case where the receiver a  really assimilates the obtained information. 
In other words, agent a originally does not fully believe the fact h{¢i}iel, but by invoking the opera- 
tion, she fully believes this fact.  The format for our belief revision operator therefore further specializes to: 
{  L;(K)4incorp(¢)  if ~Pil E L;(K)  or ...  or ~i, E L~-(K) 
z~(L: (K),cpart(~b))  =  L~(K)  otherwise 
For this type of belief revision operator we can characterize almost safety: 
Theorem  6.1  (AS  Operation  Theorem)  Consider a belief maintenance operation A  of the form: 
{  L2(K)+ineorp(¢ )  ifqoi,  E Lj(K)  or ...  or ~i,  C Lz(K) 
A(L~(K),cpart(¢))  =  L~ (K)  otherwise 
Operation  ~  is  an  AS  operation for  a  with  respect  to  {~bi}i~/  iff every  assumption  in  the  sequence 
~il  E Lj(K)  or ...  or qoi. E L2(K )  entails that the almost-safety test holds in C(a,K). 
Evidently, our goal is to define an AS operation  for general cases.  There remain however complications. 
For example it is not possible to check that a set of formulas K  is consistent by testing whether particular 
formulas belong to K  or not.  Therefore we need some further assumptions.  We only consider DB sets K 
for a for which  the combined  sub-belief sets L~i(K ) are consistent.  Another additional condition is that 
4called a type 5 belief  maintenance operation  in [0] 
75 we only consider DB set  K  for an agent a  for which knowledge and belief coincide:  K  ~  LaT  ~  ~  for 
any ~.  We call such an agent a  a skeptic agent in K.  An operation  which is  AS  under  the above two 
additional assumptions will be called a  restricted AS operation. 
Definition  6.2  (Restricted  AS  Operation)  A  belief maintenance operation A  : K  x  LD --~ K  is said 
to  be a restricted almost safe one for agent a  C An  with  respect to  {¢i}ic1,  iff for any  DB set K  ~  K 
for a  such  that  (i) L2(K )  ~cpart(~),  (ii) L;(K)  ~incorp(g,),  (iii) agent a  is  a skeptic  agent  in K, 
and (iv) any combined sub-belief set from K  is consistent, it holds that A( L;( K),cpart( g,) ) ~incorp(¢) 
only when psii is almost safe for a  in K. 
Theorem 6.2  (Restricted  AS  Operation  Theorem)  Suppose that a belief maintenance operation A 
is a type 5 operation like: 
{  L2(K)4{¢i}iei  if~i~  C L2(K)  or ...  or ~ol, E L2(K) 
~(L~-(g),cpart(,¢)) =  L;(K)  otherwise 
is a restricted AS operation for a with respect to {¢i}ieI iff for every belief state  K  satisfying the condi- 
tions (i),  (ii),  (iii) and (iv) above,  every assumption  in the sequence ~i~  e  L~-(K)  or ...  or ~i,  E n2(g) 
entails that the almost-safety test holds in C(a, K). 
After these preparations we are finally ready to define a  restricted AS operation for the agent a  with 
respect  to the obtained information {~bi}ieI where I  =  {il,...ik}.  The defined operation considers  two 
kinds of typical situations.  The first situation is that each informant fully relies both on other informants 
and on herself about what they say, i.e.,  k  k  Aj=I Aj,=i Dij@¢(ij,).  In this situation, every informant plays 
a role of an "expert" on the information she offers as defined in [0]. Note that for each informant il, the 
above condition can be reduced to the condition  k  k  Aj=I Di,,i~¢(ij) A hj=1 Dij,i~¢(ij). 
The second situation is one which already supports  a  stronger notion of safety, meaning that  some 
k  informant il considers the obtained set consistent with her beliefs, i.e., -~Lwq-7 A j=l ¢(ij).  Since according 
to the honesty condition, each informant iz already believes what she offers, the above condition can be 
k  weakened to the less restrictive condition =Lw  h -, Aj=l,j#l ¢(ij).  Formally we define our operation as a 
simplified type 5 operation as follows: 
The Definition  of Operation  ATe81 (for Agent  a): 
(A1)  k  k  L~(I()Z~ra81cpart(¢)  L~-(K)+incorp(~,).  hj=l Dil,i~O(ij) A Aj=i Di~,ijO(ij) ~  = 
(A2)  k  k  L; (K)~raslcpart(¢)  L~ (K)4incorp(~b).  hj=l Di~,ij ,¢(ij) A hj=l Di~,i~O(ij) ~  = 
.oo... 
(Ak)  k  k  Aj=I Dik,~j  ¢(ij) h Aj:i Di~,i~  ¢(ij) ~  L 2 (K)A,a,lcpart(¢) =  L 2 (K)+incorp(¢). 
k  L2(g)A~81cpart(¢)  L2(g)4incorp(¢)"  (B1) -~Li,-~ hi=2 ¢(ij) ~  = 
k  L;(K)~raslcpart(¢)  L;(K)+incorp(~).  (B2) ~ii2~ Aj=I,j¢2  ¢(ij) ~  = 
76 h  k-1  (Bk)  -~Li~  ,~j=~ ¢(ij) ~  L;(g)~r~cpart(¢)=  L2(K)+incorp(¢ ). 
For  the  above  operation,  the  cases  (A1)-(Ak)  are  representative  for  the  original problem  as  posed  by 
Schoenmakers,  since we need no further information about  source agents' beliefs other than  the general 
information about the rely-on relations among agents.  The cases (B1)-(Bk) deal with the situation where 
agent a may have previously collected some information about  the source agents' beliefs and the obtained 
information  is already safe.  Although these situations  are not  representative for our problem,  handling 
those situation is necessary for obtaining a more general operation. 
Theorem  6.3  The operation &rasl is a restricted AS operation for agent a with respect to {¢i}ieI. 
PROOF.  Let A(1) =  ~  k  Aj=~ Di~,ij¢(ij) A Aj=I Di~,ij¢(ij),  where 1 ~  {1, 2, ..., k}; 
and B(1)  k  {1,2,...,k};  :  ~Li~  ~  Aj=l,j¢l, where l 
We have  to  show that  (A(1)  E  L~-(K)  or  A(2)  C  L~(K) or  ...  or  A(k)  E L2(K)  or  B(1)  e  L~(K) 
or ...  or B(k) ~ L2(K))implies that  (ASTS) holds in C(a,K). 
It is sufficient to show that (1) A(1) e L2(K) ~  L~,i(K) ~  {¢i}ieI, and 
(2) B(1) e L;(K) ~  L~(K) U {¢i}ieI is consistent, for 1 <  l <  k. 
Case (1) 
A(1) e L~(K) 
k  k  L~(K)  (by definition of'A(/))  Aj=I Di~,i~¢(ij) A Aj=I Dij,i~¢(ij) E 
L  k  A~=i Dij,li¢(iJ))  '  (by Definition of L2(K))  K  ~  ~(Aj=I ni,ii¢(iJ) A 
=~ K~  k  k  /~j=l Di~,i~¢(ij) h Aj=I D/~,ij¢(ij)  (since a is a skeptic agent) 
K  A  ^ L/j¢(ij))  (by the honesty condition) 
{~Pi}ieI C L~,t(g )  (by definition of L~,i(K)) 
L~,i(K) ~  {¢i}iEI. 
Case (2) 
B(1) E L;(K) 
k  L2(K )  (by definition of B(1))  hj=l,jcz  e 
=V K  ~  La(~Lil~  k  Aj=l,ict¢(i~))  (by definition of L2(K)) 
k  K  ~  ~Li,~ Aj=l,j¢l ¢(ij)  (since a is a skeptic agent) 
~K~-  k  Li~Aj=l,j¢l ¢(ij)  (since K  is consistent) 
L~(K) ~  ~A~=l,j¢l¢(ij)  (by definition of L~(K)) 
Aj=lh#t ¢(~J)  (by soundness)  L~(K) ~/  k  • 
L~(K) U {A~=l,j¢l ¢(ij)} is consistent.  (meta reasoning) 
L~(K) U {¢i}ieI is consistent.  (by honesty) 
[] 
Using the  definition  of the  operation  ~ra81  and  the  above  theorem,  it  becomes  a  straightforward 
application  to  construct  a  restricted  AS  operation  for  the judge;  just  consider  the special  case  where 
77 I  =  {wl,w2}  and  {¢i}ieI =  {¢(wl)  =  p,f,(w2)  =  p  ~  q}, i.e., the agent  wl  offers information p,  and 
agent w2 offers information p ~  q. 
The 
(A1) 
(A2) 
(B1) 
(82) 
Definition of Operation  ~jp  (for Agent  a): 
Dwl,w~(P ~  q)AD~ol,wlpADw2,w2(P ~  q) ~  L~-(K)AjpLa,wlpALa,w~(P ~  q) =  L~-(K)4pA(p ~  q). 
Dw~,wlP A Dwa,wlP A Dw~ivo2(P ~  q) =~ L~-(I()AjpL~,wlp A L~,w2(P ~  q) = Lz( K)+p A (p ~  q). 
~Lwa-~q =v L~-(K)~jpLa,wap A La,w2(P ~  q) = L~(K)-~p A (p ~  q). 
~Lw2~P ~  LZ(K)~jpLa,wlP h La,w2(P ~  q) = L~'(K)4p A (p ~  q). 
There remains the task of presenting this rather intricate solution in some more conceptual way.  In 
order to explain  our solution to someone who understands  the original puzzle  but  is  not  able to grasp 
the full power of the logic machinery called into action, we can present a new sequel to the Judge puzzle 
story which leads to an unexpected solution.  Assuming that the judge drew his conclusion based on our 
restricted AS  operation, we discover that  the unacceptability of the state  of affairs  as indicated by the 
original story only is  represents  a  temporary stage in the process of exchanging information and incor- 
poration of beliefs.  The continuation of the story (the part  which Schoenmakers did not include in his 
paper)  goes as follows: 
When the judge was told that p  was true by the witness wl and learned that the implication 
p  ~  q was true from witness w2, she had to figure out whether these assertions could be accepted 
together.  Now the judge  had good  reasons for not  asking  the  witnesses for more  information 
about  their knowledge,  since she could base her decision  already  on her knowledge of the  rely- 
on  relation.  She  knew  that  witness  wl  was  the  only  authority  concerning  the  statement  p, 
and  that  witness  w2  was  the  only  authority  concerning  the  conditional  p  ~  q.  Moreover, 
this  information  was common  knowledge  among  both  witnesses  and  herself.  Therefore,  she 
could safely conclude  that q  was true,  and consequently she ordered the verdict  to be  executed. 
When they learned about this execution  both  witnesses w l  and w2 came forward and protested 
against  the verdict,  claiming that q was false.  The judge patiently  informed witness wl  about 
the  witness w2%  belief that p  ~  q  was  true.  Because  the  witness wl  accepted  that  w2  was 
the  authority  on  the implication p ~  q,  wl  accepted this  assertion,  and had to agree  with  the 
judge.  She  also  told witness w2  about  wl 's  belief,  that p  was true,  and consequently  witness 
w2 also had to  agree  with her verdict,  since w2  accepted  that  the wl  was the  authority  about 
p.  In the  end everybody was satisfied. 
7  Conclusions 
We have formalized the problem of information acquisition in a  multi agent environment.  The danger of 
accepting information from several agents as illustrated in the judge puzzle is an inherent consequence of 
disagreement among the informants; there exists no absolute safe set of obtained information other than 
trivial sets, and safe or strongly safe sets are defined only relative the full believe state which in general 
is unknown to the receiver. 
8  .° Formalizing this problem in a belief dependence framework does not offer an easy way out; however, by 
assuming the initial role-knowledge assumption, honesty, skepticism for the judge and a few consistency 
conditions, and by considering a highly specialized  belief maintenance operation a restricted almost safe 
solution for the judge puzzle  has been obtained.  This solution has moreover the nice property that it is 
computable. 
Notwithstanding its complexity, our solution has some interesting features:  it is based on a general 
theory supported by psychological evidence, and the tools used for the solution were not developed for the 
purpose of solving the Judge puzzle.  We consider  it highly unlikely that there exist  "cleaner" solutions 
to this problem (aside of simply denying it to be a problem). 
For  designers of intelligent database systems and expert  systems our results suggest  the following 
guideline:  When combining expertise from different expert sources, ensure that the contributing agents 
involved recognize each other to be the expert on their respective contributions. If the situation should 
ever arise that some contributing agent starts complaining about the knowledge stored in the system, the 
designer,  by following our guidefine, has ensured that during the subsequent debate she won't be forced to 
redesig n  the knowledge base; instead the complaining informants will learn something they didn't know 
before. 
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